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I I
The Confidentiality of Medical Quality Assurance Records
Major William A. Woodruff
Instructor, Administrative & Civil Law'Division, TJAGSA
Introduction
The Department of Defense (DOD) Authorization Act
for fiscal year 19871 contains a provision that makes rec-
ords created in a medical quality assurance (QA) program
confidential and precludes participants in quality assurance
activities from testifying about the records or about any of
the findings, recommendations, evaluations, opimons, or ac-
tions taken by the QA activity. 2 The statutory privilege,
which allows disclosure of QA information only in certain
limited situations, is designed to improve the quality of
medical care by encouraging a thorough and candid medi-
cal peer review process 3 This article will briefly discuss the
major provisions of the new law and how it will affect the
Army's QA program.
The Army Medical Corps' Quality Assurance Program 4
is intended to assure the highest quality of medical care and
treatment possible wit.lin-the available resources. The pro-
gram encompasses patient, care assessment,
credentialing, 6 utilization review,'I and risk,imanagement.5
The heart of the program is the process of peer review. Peer
review subjects the care and treatment rendered by a partic-
ular health care provider to the critical scrutiny of other
professionals. The goal is to learn from one's own mistakes
and the mistakes of others, and to develop procedures and
processes that will minimize the chance of error. As doctors
an nurses, as well as other health care providers, improve
their individual skills and patch "gaps" in the system, the
result will be a continuing improvement in the quality of
medical care delivered at the particular facility. The end re-
sult, the highest possible quality of medical care, benefits all
the patients and potential patients serviced by the medical
treatment facility.
As you might imagine, a system such as this produces
many files, records, and other information that may be ex-
tremely critical of the care rendered in a particular case. 9
Disclosing that information to a patient or a patient's attor-
ney seriously hinders the defense of any malpractice claim.
To avoid disclosing damaging opinions and information
about a colleague's practice of medicine, the participants in
the peer review process may be reluctant to scrutinize the
medical care as critically as is necessary to reach the lauda-
ble goal of the highest quality of care possible. Thus, the
risk of public disclosure dilutes the efficacy of the peer re-
view process' and damages the public interest in quality
medical care. to
Both courts and legislatures have recognized the reluc-
tance among medical professionals to critically review each
other's work and have created various privileges to pre-
clude the discoverability and anissibility of information
and opinions developed in the peer review process. Prior to
'National Defense Authorization Act for Fisc l Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661, 100 Stat. -_ 1986). [hereinafter Authorization Act].
2 1d§ 705 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1102). References to specific provisions of the statute in this article will be made by citation to title 10 United States
Code.
3 See S. Rep. No 331, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 245-46 (1986).
4 Dep't of Army, Reg. No. 40-66, Medical Services-Medical Record and Quality Assurance Administration, ch. 9 (31 Jan. 1985) [hereinafter AR 40-66].
I para. 9-7. "Patient care assessment" is a systematic review of medical records and other hospital data sources designed to evaluate e q Uality of pa-
tient care as measured against' written assessment criteria develped by the medical staff. The assessment may be performed by committees on a
departmental basis or by committees formed according to certain 'tasks such as tissue review. The process is intended to identify problems or deficiencies in
the delivery of health care, establish corrective measures" and monitor the corrective actions. As established by AR 40-66, patient care assessment will in-
clude, in addition to the problem identification and correction aspect: a review of ical records for acuracy, timeliness, completeness, clinical pertinence,
and adequacy as medico-legal documents; a review ofc iiispecified cse outcomes such as hospital incurred trauma, complication, or inectin, readmis-
sion within 30 days, return to the operating room in the same'admission, return for emergency care -within 48 hours after emergendy or outpatient treatment;
and all death cases. Other aspects of patient care assessment include surgical (tissue) review, anesthesia audit, autopsy review, blood utilization review, drug
use review, and a review of hospital support services and special units such as emergency rooms, outpatient clinics, and home care programs.
6 Id. para. 9-10. "Credentialing" involves the delineation of a given practitioner's privileges to practice medicine or dentistry at a particular facility. All
health care providers who are given the authority to make independent decisions toinitiate or alter a course of medical or dental treatment will be given
individual clinical privileges based upon their training, experience, and the equipment and support available at the medical oi, dental facility. Residents, in-
terns, and others in training programs are given categorical privileges depending upon their level within the training program. Once granted, individual
clinical privileges must be reviewed annually. AR " 6 contains procediires to summarily limit, suspend, or revoke clinical privileges when the practition-
er's conduct requires such action to protect the health or safety' of patients, employees or others in the facility. In less drastic circumstances, privileges may
be limited, suspended, or revoked after the practitioner has been given notice and an opportunity to be heard.
7Id para. 9-8. "Utilization review" is resource management. The goal is cost containment. Factors such as the appropriateness of admission, services pro-
vided, length of stay, discariie planiiing and practice, aid outpatient services are reviewed to assess the prudence with which the facility's resources were
utilized. Section 701 of the Authorization Act requires the Secretary to establish by regulation diagnosis related groups (DRGs)'as the primary criteria for
allocating resources to military medical and dental facilities. DRGs have been used as a resource management tool and as the basis to determine payments
under health insurance programs in the civilian sector for someime .'
AR 40-66, para. 9-9. The risk management program is concerned primarily with accident and injury prevention and the reduction of financial loss to the
government after an untoward incident has occurred. Each medical facility is required to appoint a risk manager to direct the program. He or she will be an
Army Medical Department (AMEDD) officer in the rank of major or above or the civilian equivalent, where possible The risk manager is responsible for
S screening incidents that occur in the facility and determining whether they should be reviewed further for risk management purposes. The risk manager
serves as the primary point of contact within the medical facility for the claims judge advocate investigating potential and actual claims against the
government.
9 Merely because a thorough retrospective analysis reveals a "better" or "different" method of handling a particular case does not necessarily mean that the
physician deviated from the "standard of care" and committed malpractice.
10 See S. Rep. No. 331, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 245 (1986).
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the passage of the DOD Authorization Act for fiscal year
1987, the protection from discovery of information generat-
ed by the Army's QA program was open to question.
Attempts to protect the opinions and recommendations of
peer review committees from disclosure were based upon a
few federal cases as well as some state statutes. i1
The leading case in the federal sector on the confidentiali-
ty of peer review information is Bredice v. Doctor's
HospitaL 12 In Bredice, the plaintiff sought discovery of
minutes and reports of any board, committee, or staff mem-
ber of the defendant hospital concerning the death of
plaintiff's decedent. The defendant refused to produce the
information and the plaintiff moved the court to compel
discovery. The court denied discovery of the requested ma-
terial and found that the peer review function performed by
the committees and staff was essential to improving the
quality of medical care and treatment delivered. Further-
more, the court was convinced that "[c]andid and
conscientious evaluation of clinical practices [was] a sine
qua non of adequate hospital care" and that the public had
an overwhelming interest in having the peer review process
carried on in confidence so that "the full flow of ideas and
advice can continue unimpeded."' 3 The privilege from dis-
covery of peer review materials established by Bredice is not
absolute, however. The court noted that evidence of ex-
traordinary circumstances could overcome the public's
interest and establish sufficient cause to justify disclosure. 14
Subsequent decisions have, more or less, followed Bredice
and one can safely say that authority does exist to support
the federal common law privilege for self-evaluative materi-
als. "1 In applying the federal common law privilege, the
test normally used by the courts to determine if information
is subject to discovery entails balancing the public's interest
in protecting the confidentiality of the peer review process
against the needs of the particular party seeking discovery.
If the need for truth outweighs the public's interest in the
confidential nature of the relationship that produced the in-
formation, discovery is ordered. 16
This "balancing act" presents a problem for the judge ad-
vocate called upon to advise a hospital commander
concerning the confidentiality of QA information. The
question the commander has is not whether there is a privi-
lege, but whether particular documents reflecting the
recommendations and opinions of a particular peer review
activity will be protected from disclosure. To ensure that
the peer review process works and the incident at issue re-
ceives thorough and critical scrutiny, this question must be
answered before the documents are created. As with any ex-
ercise involving the weighing of the public's interest against
the interest of an individual litigant, it is difficult to predict,
at the time the document or information is created, whether
a particular document will withstand a challenge to the
privilege. Thus, when the opinions and recommendations
are being developed, usually well in advance of litigation,
one cannot safely say that they will not be turned over to a
plaintiff a year or two down the road. The new statutory
privilege will remove some of this uncertainty.
Generally speaking, the new statute does four things. It
establishes the confidential and privileged nature of QA in-
formation; it prohibits disclosure of the records and
testimony concerning the records except in certain specified
circumstances; it establishes penalties for unauthorized dis-
closure; and it provides immunity from civil liability for
anyone who, in good faith, participates in or provides infor-
mation to a person or body engaged in creating or
reviewing medical quality assurance records. The legislative
history is quite sparse; however, the statute is sufficiently
detailed to allow some conclusions to be made concerning
its application.
QA Information Is Confidential and Privileged
The heart of the statute is the broad declaration that
"quality assurance records . . . are confidential and privi-
leged. . . [and] . . . may not be disclosed to any person or
entity, except as provided" by the specific exceptions within
the statute. 17 Thus, the language of the statute not only
creates the privilege but also establishes the extent of the
privilege. The weighing of competing interests to determine
the discoverability of documents under the federal common
law privilege is no longer the test that determines the scope
of the privilege. If the information in question falls within
the definition of "quality assurance records" its releasability
is determined by the statute, not by a court's notion of the
relative weight of various competing interests. Further-
more, apparently not satisfied with the protection from
I Under Fed. R. Evid. 501, the pivilege"of a witness, person, government, or other entity, is determined by the principles of the common law as they may
be interpreted by the federal courts in light of reason and experience. In civil cases, when state law provides 'the rule of decision, such as a diversity action,
Rule 501 directs that state law provide the rule of privilege as well. Scott v. McDonald, 70 F.R.D. 568 (N.D. Ga. 1976). Cases brought against the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1982) look to state law to determine the liability of the government. In this
instance, however, state law is adopted and becomes federal law for the purpose of Fed. R. Evid. 501 and the federal common law of privilege applies. See
Whitman v. United States, 108 F.R.D. 5, 6 (D.N.H. 1985) (federal common law applied in an FTCA case); Mewborn v. Heckler, 101 F.R.D. 691, 693
(D.D.C. 1984) (federal common law applied in an FTCA case); Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455,459 (N.D. Cal. 1978) ("in non-diversityjurisdiction civil cases, federal privilege law will generally apply"). In interpreting the principles of the common law "in light of reason and experience" as
required by Fed. R. Evid. 501, the federal courts will consider the state privilege rules and their underlying policies. The federal courts are not, however,
required to apply the state rule. Robinson v. Magovern, 83 F.R.D. 79 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
1250 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C.1§70 , aftid, 479 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
13 Id. at 250.
14Id. at 251.
5Whitman v. United States, 108 F.R.D. 5 (D.N.H. 1985); Mewborn v. Heckler, 101 F.R.D. 691 (D.D.C. 1984); Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). _Seejenerally Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1083 (1983); Comment, Civil Procedure: Self-Evaluative Re-
ports-A Qualified Privilege in Discovery?, 57 Minn., L. Rev. 807 (1973).
t6Memorial Hosp. for McHenry County v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 1981); Schafer v. Parkview Memorial Hosp., Inc., 593 F.Supp. 61 (N.D. Ind.
1984).
17 10 U.S.C. § 1102(a).
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disclosure afforded by exemption b(5) of the Freedom of In-
formation Act (FOIA), '5 Congress expressly declared that
medical quality assurance records may not be disclosed
under FOIA. 19
'N At this point, it is probably safe to assume that much of
the future litigation under the statute will center around
whether the records or information at issue air" "1quality as-
surance records" within the meaning of the statute. A
"medical quality assurance recr" idefined as "the pro-
ceedings, records, minutes, and reports that emntiatufrom
quality assurance program activities." 20 A "medical quality
assurance program" within the meaning of the siatute is
"any activity carried out,. .to assess'the 
quality of medi-
cal care." 2 The statute specifically includes, within the
definition of quality assurance program any activity
designed to assess the quality of medical care cairied out or
conducted by individuals, committees, or other review bod-
ies responsible for credentialing, infection control, patient
care assessment, medical records, health resources manage-
ment review, and identification and prevention of medical
or dental incidents and risks. 22
To fully appreciate the breadth of the statute's coverage,
one need only compare the new federal law with some of
the state statutory schemes. As a general rule, the state
privileges are rather narrowly drawn and do not extend to
all quality assurance information and activities. The federal
law, on the other hand, is quite comprehensive and encom-
passes all aspects of the Army's current Quality Assurance
Program.
While virtually all statutes offer some degree of protec-
tion to the opinions and recommendations of a peer review
N committee, the actions taken after the peei review process is
completed are not always afforded confidentiality. The Illi-
nois statute is a good example. 23 In Gleason v. St. Elizabeth
Medical Center, 2 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
hospital was negligent in allowing her physician operating
privileges. To press her claim against the hospital, the
plaintiff sought to discover what action the hospital took af-
ter information concerning the doctor's past medical
practice came to light through depositions taken in several
malpractice cases. In interpreting the Illinois statute, the
court found that the peer review process was privileged but
that any action taken as a result of the process was outside
the protection of the statute. More recently, the Illinois Su-
preme Court agreed with the Gleason analysis in upholding
a civil contempt citation against a hospital that refused to
answer interrogatories concerning the action it had taken to
limit or suspend a physician's privileges.2
The federal statute, on the other hand, protects not only
the "proceedings, records, minutes, and reports" 26 of a
quality assurance program, but also precludes any individu- -
al who reviews or creates QA records or who participates in
a probeeding that reviews or creates the records, from testi-
fying "with respect to any finding, recommelidation,
evaluation, opinion, or action taken by such person or
body." 27 The presence of the "action taken" language in
the federal statute makes a compelling aigunent that the
mantle of confidentiality created by Congress covers the
corrective action as well as the peer review process itself.
Some state courts have interpreted their statutes as only
protecting quality assurance activities when performed by
regularly constituted committees of the hospital whose duty
it is to review and evaluate the quality of care in question. 21
Under this view, protected QA activities are rather limited
and formalized. Unless the documents, records, or informa-
ion were either created by a formal committee or done at
the specific request or direction of a committee, the privi-
lege does not attach. 29 In enacting the federal statue,
Congress apparently recognized the shortsightedness of this
approach and extended confidentiality to QA "activities," -
not just QA committees. The statute specifically envisions
QA activities being carried out by individuals apart from a
committee arrangement. 30 This should allow the Surgeon
General and hospital commanders some flexibility in ac-
complishing peer review. For example, a medical facility
may only have one or two specialists in a particular disci-
pline. In order to assess, the quality of their care, a
consultant from another facility can be called upon to re-
view their cases. The fact that the consultant is an
individual and not a "committee" of the facility involved
will not remove the documents, information, and opinions
from the protection of the statute.31
A document that can be extremely useful to a plaintiff,
and one that may initiate the peer review process, is the
155 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). Exemption b(5) allows an agency to withhold documents requested under FOIA that would not ordinarily be available to a party
in litigation with the agency. See, e.g., United States v. Weber Aircraft Co., 465 U.S. 792 (1984).
'9 10 U.S.C. § 1102(f). This provision invokes exemption b(3) of FOIA which exempts from mandatory disclosure records that are specifically exempted
from release by statute. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1982).
2
oM. § 1102(jX2)
2 1 1d. § 11020)(1).
22 Id.
23 111. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, paras. 8-2101; 8-2102; 8-2105 (Smith-Hurd 1984).
24135 I. App. 3d 92, 481 N.E.2d 780 (1985).
25 Richter v. Diamond, 108 I1. 2d 265, 483 N.E.2d 1256 (1985); accord Anderson v. Breda, 103 Wash. 2d 901, 700 P.2d 737 (1985) (applying Washington
law).
2610 U.S.C. § 1102(j)(2).
77 Id. § 1102(b)(2) (emphasis added).
28 CobuM v. Seda, 101 Wash. 2d 270, 677 P.2d 173 (1984) (en banc),
29 See. e.g., Jordan v. Court of Appeals, 701 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1985) (protected documents are those prepared by or at the direction of a committee for
committee purposes).
30 10 U.S.C. § 1102(jX1)
31 See Gutierrez v. United States, No. EP-83-CA-I16 (W.D. Tex. Discovery Order Apr. 11, 1984) (report prepared by Surgeon General's consultant con-
taining review of Army doctor's medical practice not protected under either Texas statute or federal common law privilege because the consultant was not a
"committee").
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hospital incident report. Designed to bring an unusual oc-
currence or incident to the immediate attention of
supervisory personnel, these reports are usually prepared by
the nursing staff and forwarded through channels to the
person responsible for taking corrective action. Because
they are not prepared by "committees" they may fall
outside the protection of a narrowly drawn statute, Most
cases dealing with the discoverability of incident reports re-
solve the issue on either the attorney-client privilege or the
work-product doctrine. 32 The short-comings of both of
these theories are illustrated by the decision in St. Louis
Little Rock Hospital v. Gaertner. 31 The underlying case was
a medical malpractice action for the wrongful death of an
alcoholic and chemically dependent patient who committed
suicide by drinking a bottle of toilet bowl cleanser that was
left in her hospital room. In support of their claims, plain-
tiffs sought to discover the hospital incident report prepared
by a nurse as required by the hospital's safety manual. The
hospital objected to the requested discovery and asserted
both the work-product doctrine and the attorney-client
privilege. The court found that the work-product doctrine
was not available because the incident report was prepared
as part of the hospital's program to prevent future incidents
and losses and not in anticipation of litigation. The attor-
ney-client privilege did not protect the document from
discovery because the court found that the form was not
prepared for the purpose of seeking professional legal ad-
vice, but was created in the ordinary course of business as a
meanfs of accident prevention.
Under the Army QA program, whenever an "incident" 34
occurs a report of unusual occurrence33 must be prepared
and forwarded to the head of the department within twen-
ty-four hours of the incident and should reach the risk
manager within forty-eight hours. Depending upon the na-
ture of the incident, the claims judge advocate may or may
not receive the report. Neither the attorney-client privilege
nor the work product doctrine offers much hope of protect-
ing the report from discovery. Because it is prepared at the
time the incident is first discovered and well before any
claim has been asserted, the report is not prepared "in an-
ticipation of litigation or for trial" and does not qualify for
work-product protection. 36
To be protected under the attorney-client privilege, the
document must be prepared for the purpose of obtaining le-
gal advice. The DA Form 4106, however, is routed through
non-lawyer supervisors before it gets to an attorney and, in
fact, may never be seen by an attorney at all. Under these
circumstances, a court could easily find that the primary
purpose for preparing the document was future accident
prevention and not to obtain legal advice. 3 Absent this
crucial element, the attorney-client privilege will not pro-
tect these reports from discovery.
The uncertainty surrounding the privileged status of the
incident report is eliminated by the federal statute. Under
the new law, a medical quality assurance program activity
specifically includes activities carried out to identify and
prevent medical or dental incidents and risks. 31 The DA
Form 4106 serves just such a purpose and is a report "ema-
nating from a quality assurance program activity" within
the meaning of the statute.
Reports and documents prepared by infection control
committees have been discoverable under some state laws,
but are privileged under the DOD confidentiality statute. In
Davidson v. Light, 39 the court allowed discovery of a report
containing mixed factual and opinion information prepared
by a hospital infection control committee. In distinguishing
Bredice, the court said that the mixture of fact and opinion
in the report indicated that the document was prepared as
part of the patient's ongoing medical care and was not a
retrospective review of treatment rendered in the past.
The same result was reached by the New Jersey Superior
Court in Young v. King, 40 an action alleging that plaintiffs
decedent died due to the defendant's failure to properly di-
agnose and treat a staph infection. Plaintiff, as well as four
physician co-defendants, sought an order compelling the
hospital to produce records of the Medical Record and Au-
dit Committee, the Tissue Committee, the Medical Council,
and the Infection Control Committee. In construing the
New Jersey statute, the court found that the only commit-
tee that enjoyed an immunity from discovery was the
Utilization Review Committee. The hospital's argument
that the statute "inferentially" protected all peer review
committees was rejected and discovery was ordered. Should
a similar case arise out of a DOD medical treatment facility
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the statutory definition
of quality assurance program in the new federal statute,
which includes infection control committees, tissue commit-
tees, medical record review, and resources management
review, would apply and protect the information. 41
32 Compare Sierra Vista Hosp. v. Superior Court, 248 Cal. App. 2d 359, 56 Cal. Rptr. 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (attorney-client privilege protected hospital
incident report) with Peters v. Gaggos, 72 Mich. App. 138, 249 N.W.2d 327 (1977) (work-product privilege applied to statements prepared by hospital's
investigator).
13 682 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
34 An "incident" is "any unintended or unexpected result that arises from human error or mechanical malfunction during patient care." AR 40-66, para.
9-9d.
35 Dep't of Army, Form No. 4106, Report of Unusual Occurrence (June 1973) [hereinafter DA Form 4106].
36 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Even if a document qualifies for protection under the work-product doctrine, it can still be discovered if the party seeking
discovery can establish "a substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substan-
tial equivalent of the materials by other means." Id.
37 The requirement to prepare a DA Form 4106 is part of the Risk Management Program. According to the regulation, "Risk Management. .. is con-
cerned with accident and injury prevention and the lowering of financial losses after an incident has occurred; [i)t will identify problems or potential risk
circumstances that must be eliminated or reduced to prevent accident and injury." AR 40-66, para. 9-9a.
3810 U.S.C. § 11020)(1).
3979 F.R.D. 137 (D. Colo. 1978).
40 136 N.J. Super. 127, 344 A.2d 792 (1975).
4 10 U.S.C. § 1102(j)(1).
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Another significant difference between the new federal
statute and the common law privilege and some state stat-
utes is that the federal privilege is not qualified. In
establishing the common law privilege, the Bredice court
- created only a qualified privilege and held that evidence of
extraordinary circumstances would overcome the public's
interest in confidential peer review.42 The protection af-
forded peer review documents by several state statutes is
also qualified and discovery is allowed under certain
conditions. 43
QA Information May Not Be Disclosed
The second major accomplishment of the statute is the
express prohibition against disclosure of the records and the
preclusion of testimony concerning the records or the find-
ings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions, or actions
taken by a QA activity by any person who reviews, creates,
or participates in any proceeding that reviews or creates
QA records, except as specified in the statute itself. Signifi-
cantly, the statute does not just preclude a witness from
compulsory testimony; it precludes even voluntary testimo-
ny. The statute provides that an individual "may not _be
permitted or required to testify in any judicial or adminis-
trative proceeding.'" This language should pr'eclude
decisions like Whitman v. United States, 41 where the court
held that the voluntary disclosure of certain information
during a deposition waived the privilege. The Whitman
plaintiff alleged that negligent surgery by Air Force physi-
cians resulted in facial paralysis. During the pre-trial
deposition of one of the Air Force physicians, testimony
was elicited concerning the peer review committee meeting
that reviewed the surgery in question. The doctor testified
that the meeting was held about two months after the sur-
gery, identified the individuals present, and disclosed that
an outside specialist reviewed the information developed by
the committee and concluded that he "didn't think the job
was too good." 46 The plaintiff requested production of the
record of the peer review committee and sought an order to
compel discovery when the government asserted the self-
evaluative privilege. The magistrate, relying on Bredice, de-
nied the motion to compel. The district court found that
the testimony of the doctor at his deposition constituted a
waiver of the privilege and ordered the record disclosed.
The Supreme Court of California reached a similar result
in ruling that under California law, a member ofa peer re-
view committee may waive the confidentiality afforded peer
review activities and voluntarily reveal the substance of
peer review proceedings. The case, West Covina Hospital v.
Superior Court, 41 involved a malpractice action brought
against a hospital for negligently granting surgical privi-
leges to the plaintiff's surgeon and for retaining him on the
medical staff when they knew or should have known that
he was incompetent. The plaintiff intended to call as a wit-
ness a ihmber of the hospital committee that evaluated the
surgeon's application for operating privileges. The trial
court, over the objection of the hospital, ruled that the Cali-
fornia statute providing that a hospital committee member
may not be "required" to testify did not preclude the volun-
tary testimony of the committee member. 41 Upon the
hospital's peititon for an order to compel the trial court to
reverse its ruling and exclude the testimony, the appellate
cou rt found that allowing voluntary testimony Wbuld
"punch a judicially created and legislatively unintended
hole in the crucial shield of confidentiality provided to med-
ical staff committees in medical malpractice actions [and]
would directly contravene the vital policy underlying
that immunity." 4 9 The California Supreme Court reversed.
The statute in question, the court found, clearly precluded
compulsory testimony but made no mention of voluntary
testimony. The court concluded that if the legislature in-
tended to prohibit voluntary testimony it would have done
so specifically. Responding to the underlying public policy
to encourage medical peer review by providing confidential-
ity, the court determined that by immunizing members of
hospital committees from compulsory process for their
committee work, it would be easier to attract doctors to
serve on the committees, thereby fostering peer review.
The new federal statute, unlike the California law and
the common law privilege, precludes any disclosure of QA
records except as provided by the statute. 10 Records or in-
formation covered by the federal law can be disclosed only
if one of the exceptions specified in the statute applies. Even
if an adverse party in litigation obtains a copy of a QA
record, the statute still prohibits its use in the case. The
new law specifically provides that QA records may not be
"subject to discovery or admitted into evidence"-except s
provided by the statute. 1' Thus, the concept of waiver that
appears in some state provisions and in the federal common
law rule has not been incorporated into the federal statute.
The circumstances under which either the records may
be disclosed or a person may testify as to the records are
rather limited by the new law. The statute allows disclosure
to federal or private agencies performing licensing or ac-
creditation functions regarding DOD facilities or
conducting required monitoring of DOD health care facili-
ties. 52 This will allow the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) access to the QA files of
42 Bredice v. Doctors Hospital 50 F.R.D. 249, 251 (D.D.C. 1970).
4 3D•C. Code Ann. § 32-505 (1981) (discovery allowed upon a showing of "extraordinary necessity"); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 32 § 3296 (1978) (discovery
allowed upon a showing of "good cause"); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 71-2046 to -2048 (1981) (discovery allowed for "good cause arising from extraordinary cir-
cumstances"); Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-581.16 to -581.17 (1984) (discovery allowed for "good cause arising from extraordinary circumstances").
44 10 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(2) (emphasis added).
41 108 F.R.D. 5 (D.N.H. 1985).
4 61Id. at 8.
4741 Cal. 3d 846, 718 P.2d 119 226 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1986).
- 41 Cal. Evid. Code § 1157(b) (West Supp. 1987).
4 9 West Covina Hospital v. Superior Court, 165 Cal. App. 3d 794, 211 Cal. Rptr. 677, 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
50 10 U.S.C. § 1102(a) & (b).
5 1 Id. § 1102(b)(1) (emphasis added).
2 Id. § 1102(c)(1)(A).
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DOD hospitals that are undergoing accreditation
inspection.
The statute also allows release of QA records to an ad-
ministrative or judicial proceeding brought by a current or
former DOD health care provider concerning the termina-
tion, limitation, or suspension of the health care provider's
clinical privileges. "1 Basic fairness dictates that the affected
practitioner have access to the information relied upon and
the rationale for a decision to curtail or terminate his or her
clinical privileges.
QA records may also be disclosed to governmental
boards, agencies, or professional health care societies if
needed to perform licensing, credentialing, or monitoring of
the professional standards of any present or former member
or employee of DOD.'54 Similarly, disciosure is permitted
when the records or information ae' requested by another
hospital or medical treatment facility and are needed to as-
sess the professional qualifications of a current or former
DOD health care provider. 5 These types of disclosures are
consistent with the goal of providing quality health care.
Certainly, professional societies charged with the responsi-
bility of certifying a particular physician as a "specialist" in
a given discipline should have access to peer review infor-
mation concerning the physician's practice. By the same
token, when a health care provider seeks staff privileges at a
hospital, the hospital should be allowed to make a decision
based upon all of the infomation available concerning the
applicant, including his or her track record at other facili-
ties. Indeed, the failure to make inquiry or consider such
information can give rise to liability on the part of the
health care facility. 56
The federal statute also allows disclosure to officers, em-
ployees, and contractors of DOD who have need for QA
information in the performance of their official duties. '5 '
Under this provision, claims officers, criminal investigators,
the Inspector General, and others may gain access to QA
information in the performance of their official duties. Ac-
cess to QA information by criminal investigators is
controversial within the medical profession and opponents
of this particular use of QA information almost precluded
the draft legislation from ever leaving the Pentagon. In
view of the strong feelings about this issue, implementing
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Defense could
establish procedures to review requests for information and
remove the access decision from the discretion of the indi-
vidual investigator. By placing the decision in the hands of
a senior commander, both the needs of the medical profes-
sion and the needs of the criminal investigator could be
balanced in determining whether disclosure would serve the
best interests of the agency. 58
Whiie DOD law enforcement personnel ca n gain access
to QA information based upon a need to know in the per-
formance of their official duties, civilian agencies charged
with enforcement of criminal or civil laws may obtain QA
records onljif they are charged under "applicable law, with
the protection of the public health or safety, [and] if a qual-
ified representative of . .. (the] agency makes a written
request that such record or testimony be provided for a
purpose authorized by law." 9 Similarly, disclosure may be
made in an administrative or judicial proceeding brought
by the civilian agency to protect the public health or safe-
ty. 60 Disclosure under this exception may arise in a state
prosecution for the unauthorized or unlicensed practice of
medicine or in an action to revoke a license to practice
medicine issued by the state.
Once disclosure of privileged information occurs, the
protection of the statute is not lost. The records of the QA
activity or testimony given concerning the QA process re-
mains confidential and further disclosure may be made only
as specifically provided. 61 This prohibition against disclo-
sure is not limited to participants in the peer review
process, but extends to any "person or entity having posses-
sion of or access" to QA records or testimony. 62
Furthermore, the nature of the initial disclosure is irrele-
vant; the statute simply precludes disclosure "in any
manner or for any purpose except as provided in this sec-
tion." 63 Thus, if information is "leaked" or inadvertently
disclosed, the recipient of the unauthorized disclosure is
precluded from further disclosure.
Penalties for Unauthorized Disclosure
To underscore the seriousness with which Congress views
the peer review function, the federal statute provides for
penalties for unauthorized disclosures of QA information. 64
Penalties range from a $3,000 fine for a first offense of will-
ful disclosure of a QA record to a $20,000 fine for
subsequent violations. 65 The penalty provisions apply to
"(a]ny person" and will reach not only the government em-
ployee who makes an unauthorized disclosure, but will also
apply to recipients of authorized and unauthorized releases
who make further disclosure of the privileged information.
An important task in implementing the new law will be
to inform both medical and administrative personnel of the
I-
"Id. § 1102(c)(1)(B).
541d. § 1102(c)(1)(C).
"Id. § 1102(c)(l)(D).
56See, e.g., Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hospital, 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis, 1981).
5 10 U.S.C. § 1102(c)(1)(E).
58 While this approach reintroduces a degree of uncertainty inherent in any "balancing act" (see supra test accompanying notes 15-16), at least the weighing
of the competing interests can be done by a senior military commander and not a civilian judge.
59 10 U.S.C. § 102(c)(1)(F).
601d. § 1102(c)(1)(G).
6 11d. § 1102(e).
62 id.
63 Id.
64Id. § 1102(k).
65id.
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consequences of an unauthorized disclosure of QA informa-
tion. Before a fine can be assessed fOr an unauthorized
disclosure, the statute requires a willful disclosure with
knowledge that the record is a QA record. The local judge
"" advocate should make certain that every one who may even
remotely come in contact with quality assurance informa-
tion is aware of its confidential nature and the penalties for
unauthorized disclosure. Lectures and briefings should be
conducted and consideration should be given to labeling all
QA documents as such. Included in any label should be a
warning that unauthorized disclosure carries a $3,000 fine.
Prominently marking QA documents in this manner will
not only establish the element of knowledge necessary to
impose a fine, but also will serve as an ever-present remind-
er of the consequences of improper disclosure. This should
foster an attitude of caution on the part of personnel
charged with the creation and maintenance of QA files, rec-
ords, and information. Perhaps this ounce of prevention
will be better than several pounds of cure. Of course, label-
ing documents as QA records will also require the Army
and the other services to make a conscious determination as
to what is and what is not a QA record, an exercise that
will require a careful view of the entire QA program. If im-
plementing directives require all QA records to be lbe d
ass uc ll behrd pressed I n1 a rt late
on that a non-labeled document is really a QA record that
we just overlooked.
Civil Immunity for Participants in QA Activities
The fourth major component of the federal statute is the
grant of qualified immunity to participants in quality assur-
ance activities. The statute provides one who participates in
or provides information to a quality assurance activity im-
munity from civil liability "if the participation or provision
of information was in good faith based on prevailing profes-
sional standards at the time the medical quality assurance
program activity took place." 66 In view of other immuni-
ties available to military members and federal civilian
employees for actions taken within the course and scope of
their employment, this provision may not seem impor-
tant. 67 It does, however, serve to immunize individuals who
are not government employees, such as patients, civilian
physicians, and others who might be asked to provide infor-
mation toa peer review activity. As Jlong as the information
was proviey ngo at h nhrn4wl einr
from liability for defamation and other civil actions.
6j6d. § 1102(g).
Information Developed Outside a QA Program
is not Protected
Lest all of the emphasis or privilege and confidentiality
obscure the obvious, in enacting the new law Congress spe-
cifically pointed out that "[n]othing in this section shall be
construed as limiting access to the information in a record
created and maintained outside a medical quality assurance
program . . . on the grounds that the information was
presented during meetings of a review body that are part of
a medical quality assurance program." 68 This means infor-
mation in the patient's medical record is not protected by
the statute even though it may be presented to a peer re-
view body and become incorporated into a QA record.
We can expect the courts to extend a sympathetic ear to
requests for information developed apart from the estab-
lished QA program. In keeping with the principle that
privileges should be narrowly construed because they
hinder the search for truth by preventing the discovery and
admission of relevant evidence, 69 the courts will most likely
apply the statutory privilege only to-i"nformation' clearly de-
veloped as part of the agency's announced QA program as
set forth in its regulations. In other words, any doubts
about whether a particular document is a QA record will
most likely be resolved in favor of the party seeking disclo-
su Investigftions and information gathered under the
provisions of other regulations, programs, or directives will
not be afforded the statutory privilege. For example, the re-
quirement to conduct an investigation under Army
Regulation 15-670 "[w]heneveie is substantial question
that death or serious bodily injury may have resulted from
substand 'rd care oi neigence' ' 71 was imposed by the Sur-
geon General by electronic message. A court may not
consider it a part of the QA program et2i- by Af
4 fact, the message specifies that it does not change
the "MTF commander's responsibility to take appropriate
actions under AR 40-66" when a serious incident occurs,
implying that the investigation is in addiion to the require-
ments of the QA program and not a part of the program. 72
A court could -easily determine that any investigation con-
ducted under this directive is "outside a medical quality
assurance program" and not entitled'to the protection of
the statute. '7 In order to derive full benefit from the confi-
dentiality of QA records provided by the new law, the
Surgeon General should give serious consideration to bring-
ing such investigations under the purview of the QA
program.
67 See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (military commander immune from liability for constitutional torts brought by enlisted subordinates);
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (federal civilian employees may not maintain constitutional tort for adverse personnel action against their superiors);
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 486 (1978) (federal officials have qualified immunity from constitutional torts); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (federal
officials have absolute immunity from common law torts); see also Kwoun v. Southeast Missouri Professional Standards Review Org., No, 85-2379 (8th Cir.
Feb. 4, 1987) (federal officials in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) with oversight responsibility for the Medicare program and the
private professional standards review organization under contract with 4f1S! to ine stigate facilities and physicians suspected of Medicare abuses enjoy abso-
lute immunity from constitutional torts).
68 10 U.S.C. § 1102(h).
69 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
7
oDep't of the Army, Reg. No. 15-6, Boards, Commissions, and Committees-Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers, (24 Aug. 1977)
S(Cl, 15 June 1981).
71Dep't of the Army Message 161200Z Oct 85, subject: Command Management and Reporting Requirements of Serious Incidents Resulting From Poten-
tially Substandard Care, reprinted in Dep't of the Army Message 091715Z Jun 86, subject: Command Management and Reporting Requirements of Serious
Incidents Resulting From Potentially Substandard Care.
7i 10 U.S.C. § 1102(h).
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Conclusion
Congress has provided military medicine with a compre-
hensive privilege for QA information to ensure that medical
peer review can be carried out with maximum confidentiali-
ty. The statute fills holes in the common law privilege
previously relied upon to protect QA information from dis-
closure and covers documents and information beyond the
scope of many states' peer review privilege laws. To take
full advantage of the statute, the services should conduct a
detailed review of their entire QA operation and bring all
ancillary investigations and activities under the auspices of
the established QA program. Having provided the shield of
9onfidentiality, Congress will no doubt expect the military
to carry out medical quality assurance programs thorough-
ly and aggressively. The candid peer review fostered by the
new law will improve the quality of medical care by identi-
fying and either training or eliminating the substandard
practitioner and by correcting systemic errors. The ball is
now in the doctor's court.
Witnesses: The Ultimate Weapon
Major Vaughan E. Taylor, USAR
Individual Mobilization Augmentee, Criminal Law Division, TJAGSA
Introduction
Contested issues, whether occurring during the motions,
findings, or sentencing stages of a court-martial, are usually
won or lost based upon the witnesses'who testify for each
side. Good advocates generally litigate only close issues be-
cause those that are clear are usually resolved out-of-court
through alternative disposition negotiations or pretrial
agreements. No case can be stronger than the witnesses
who support it, and no amount of skillful oratory can resur-
rect a case doomed by the weaknesses of its witnesses. This
article is designed to help judge advocates prepare the de-
fense or prosecution of a court-martial by focusing on the
most critical players in that drama. The case itself is usually
created by its facts and circumstances before the attorney
ever hears of it.The' trial'lawyer Ithen becomes its "produc-
er, director, and narrator." One's skills as a "narrator" are
shaped by innate abilities, courses in advocacy, and trial ex-
periences themselves. This'article will hone the trial
lawyer's skill in -"producing and directing" the performance
of the "actors" by presenting a methodology for finding,
preparing, and presenting these "stars" of the "play."
The techniques discussed here are only guidelines and, of
course, are not applicable to every situation. Like all
"rules," they are subject to exception based on unusual cir-
cumstances or one's unique style. Arguments of counsel are
not evidence, and physical or documentary evidence rarely
possesses the great power of persuasion that can be found
on the face, heard in the voice, and seen in the eyes of a tri-
al lawyer's ultimate weapon--the witness!
The Search for Witnesses
,The first place to look for witnesses is in the case file it-
self, which will list -and usually 'include statements or
summaries of statements from the witnesses that the com-
mand and the investigative agency consider to be material.
Model Code of Professional Resonsibiity Canon 7(1980).2ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 1,1(c) (2d ed. 1980).
3 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 46, 10 U.S.C. § 846 (1982) [hereinafter
The best way to begin your search for other material wit-
nesses is by interviewing your "client." Although it is
6bvi6us that a defense counsel's client is the accused, I it is
helpful to realize that the trial counsel's "client" is techni-
cally the interest of justice, 2 which usually equates with the
interests of the Vietim, be it human or an institution such as'
a command structure. Accuseds and victims are usually all
in immediate need of your professional help. All have mem-
ories that not only will fade with time, but also will do so
even more rapidly if they are left to feel that their cause is
unimportant because they are neglected. Witnesses can for-
get, withdraw, hide, be transferred, and even die with
alarming rapidity. Speed in reaching them and discovering
exactly what they have to say is critical. Time becomes even
more of the essence as the magnitude of the issues escalates
because, as the stakes get higher, details often become more
important.
Article 46 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice'
guarantees to each side equal access to witnesses. The right
to have testimony of witnesses at either the trial on the
merits or the extenuation and mitigation portion of the
court-martial extends only to witnesses whose testimony is
material to an issue before the court . 4 There is no right to
the personal attendance of even a material witness, howev-
er, if the testimony would be merely cumulative to that of
others ,at trial. 5 Refusing to comply with a subpoena to ap-
pear as a witness before a court-martial is an offense that
may be prosecuted in United States district court or in a
court of original criminal jurisdiction; punishment may in-
elude a $500 fine, imprisonment for not more than six
months, or both. 6 Of course, witnesses in the military can
simply be ordered to appear and testify before military
tribunals anywhere. The accused's right to obtain a witness
is not absolute; however, if the witness is actually unavaila-
ble or not amenable to the court's process, other methods of
securing that testimony must be pursued, such as the taking
4 United States v. Combs, 20 M.J. 441 (C.M.A. 1985); United States v. Courts, 9 M.J. 285 (C.M.A. 1980).
5 United States v. Tangpuz, 5 M.J. 426 (C.M.A. 1978); Mil. R. Evid. 403.
6UCMJ art. 47; see United States v. Hinton, 21 M.J. 267 (C.M.A. 1986).
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